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In the theory of repeated games, the benchmark assumption is that of per-
fect monitoring, i.e., the players obtain perfect information about the other
players’ past actions. Under the assumption, the theory shows that the
players can sustain a large set of payoﬀ vectors as equilibria by making their
actions contingent on the other players’ past actions.1 The recent litera-
ture relaxes the assumption of perfect monitoring and considers the case in
which players receive only imperfect (public or private) information about
the other players’ past actions.2
The present paper relaxes the assumption of perfect monitoring in a
diﬀerent direction. We consider the case in which it is possible for the
players to obtain perfect information about the other players’ past actions
but it is costly. We assume that at the end of each period, each player
decides whether to obtain information about the actions chosen by the other
players in the period. Obtaining the information costs a certain amount of
utility, which is referred to as the observation cost. If a player chooses not
to pay the observation cost at the end of a period, then she obtains no
information about the other players’ actions chosen in the period.3 We also
assume that a player’s observation decision itself is not observable to the
other players. Perfect monitoring can be considered as the limit case in
which the observation costs are zero for all players.
It is important to note that the model of costly monitoring diﬀers consid-
erably from that of perfect (costless) monitoring even when the observation
costs are arbitrarily small as long as they are positive. To see this, con-
sider a repeated prisoners’ dilemma with costly monitoring. Suppose that
the players use the trigger strategy proﬁle, in which each player starts with
cooperation but switches to perpetual defection if (and only if) a defection
is observed in the past. If the observation costs are zero and the players
are suﬃciently patient, then the trigger strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium.
However, this strategy proﬁle is not an equilibrium when the observation
1See, e.g., Abreu (1986, 1988) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
2For the case of imperfect public monitoring, see, e.g., Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti (1990), Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994), and Fudenberg and
Levine (1994). For the case of imperfect private monitoring, see, e.g., Sekiguchi (1997),
Bhaskar and van Damme (2002), Bhaskar and Obara (2002), Ely and Valimaki (2002),
Mailath and Morris (2002), Matsushima (2002), and Piccione (2002).
3This formulation raises a subtle issue on when the players receive payoﬀs. While this
is discussed in detail in subsequent sections, for the time being imagine that the payoﬀs
are received as a whole when the game “ends,” interpreting the discount factor as the
probability with which the game continues.
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costs are strictly positive even when they are arbitrarily small. The reason
is simply that since the strategy proﬁle is deterministic, each player knows
the other player’s past and future actions on the equilibrium path and has
no reason to pay the observation costs. Therefore, in equilibrium, no one
monitors the other player. However, then deviations from the strategy pro-
ﬁle are not detected and hence cooperation is not sustained as an equilib-
rium. This argument generalizes and we can show that at any pure-strategy
equilibrium of a repeated game with observation costs, the players play a
stage-game equilibrium in every period (with no observation activity).4
Therefore, a construction of non-trivial cooperative/eﬃcient equilibria
must use strategy proﬁles in which some of the players randomize. The
main contribution of the present paper is to show that such a construction
is possible and therefore some positive results are obtained in a wide class
of situations. First, we provide a suﬃcient condition for a payoﬀ vector
to be approximated by a sequential equilibrium when the observation costs
are suﬃciently small and the players are suﬃciently patient. Using the
condition, we then prove an approximate Folk Theorem for several classes
of repeated games with observation costs. The approximate Folk Theorem
is shown to hold for a variant of prisoners’ dilemma, partnership games, and
any game in which the players have an ability to “burn” small amounts of
their own payoﬀs.
An important assumption for the positive results is small observation
costs. The results say only that a large set of payoﬀ vectors can be sustained
when the observation costs are small and the players are patient. We are
unable to prove a general Folk Theorem/eﬃciency result for a given level of
observation cost. However, we believe that our result is of some economic
relevance because in many interesting economic applications, the observation
costs can be considerably small. For example, consider two ﬁrms competing
in terms of prices. If these ﬁrms compete in a small local market, it can
be a matter of walking several blocks to see the rival’s prices. The cost of
such activity can be indeed small in comparison with the magnitude of their
business.
More theoretically, it can be argued that the approximate Folk Theorem
4The unobservability of monitoring decisions plays an important role in the result. If
monitoring decisions are observable, then the situation does not diﬀer very much from
perfect monitoring. Indeed, in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with observation costs,
cooperation can be sustained by a modiﬁed trigger strategy proﬁle in which punishment
is triggered by not only a single defection but also a single failure to observe the other
player’s action. On the other hand, the perfect observability of monitoring decisions is
diﬃcult to imagine when the monitoring activity takes the form of spying or glimpsing.
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demonstrates the robustness of the assumption of perfect monitoring. On
the one hand, many regard perfect monitoring as an extreme assumption. In
reality, information about the past comes at a (possibly small) cost. On the
other hand, as we have seen before, the model with zero observation costs
and the one with positive costs diﬀer signiﬁcantly in terms of the incentive
for monitoring. Thus, it is theoretically an interesting question whether
the two models yield qualitatively similar results, justifying our approach to
regard perfect monitoring as a limit of costly monitoring.
A few papers have studied repeated games with costly monitoring. Ahn
and Suominen (2001) consider a random matching game (like the one in
Kandori (1992)) with a twist that each player is given an opportunity to
invest in a monitoring technology in the initial period. If the player invests
in the technology in the initial period, she can observe her neighbors’ actions
in all subsequent periods. Thus the costly monitoring activity in their model
has a once-and-for-all nature. In our model, on the other hand, the player
has to engage in costly monitoring in every period if she wants to keep track
of the other players’ behavior completely.
A paper more closely related to ours is Miyahara (2002), who considers
a repeated prisoners’ dilemma in which monitoring at the end of a period
gives a player information not only about the period but also about some
of the previous periods. Miyahara (2002) shows that eﬃciency can be ap-
proximated if the monitoring costs are suﬃciently small. It is important
to point out that the result in the present paper does not subsume that of
Miyahara (2002) since the latter uses a construction that takes advantage
of the assumption that more than one period in the past can be observed.
Our model is a special example of repeated games with private monitor-
ing. Since each player’s observation (if any) is not observable to the other
players, it is private information, which makes our model private monitor-
ing. The literature of repeated games with private monitoring has focused
on the case when players receive noisy signals of the other players’ actions
costlessly, while we examine the case when players obtain complete informa-
tion if they pay observation costs. Thus, the results and the construction of
cooperative/eﬃcient equilibria in the literature do not apply in our model.
However, this does not mean that our model has no bearing on repeated
games with noisy costless private monitoring. In Section 6, we brieﬂy dis-
cuss what happens if costly monitoring is introduced into repeated games
with noisy private monitoring.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the model. Section 3 provides important deﬁnitions. Section 4
states our main result, describes the strategy proﬁle used in the proof, and
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sketches the proof. Section 5 applies the result to prove an approximate
Folk Theorem in a variant of prisoners’ dilemma, partnership games, and
games with an opportunity of utility burning. Section 6 discusses possible
extensions of our model. The Appendix proves the main result.
2 Model
The stage game is a ﬁnite n-player game G = {n,A, (ui)ni=1}, where A =
×ni=1Ai and ui : A → R is player i’s stage payoﬀ function. We often write
u(a) = (ui(a))ni=1. For each i, let Si be the set of all mixed actions for
player i and let S = ×ni=1Si. For a mixed action proﬁle s ∈ S, we abuse
notation and let ui(s) denote the expected payoﬀ of player i under s. Let
“co” denote convex hull, and deﬁne V = co{u(a) : a ∈ A}, which is the set
of feasible payoﬀ vectors.
Game G itself does not include monitoring activity. Thus, precisely
speaking, G is not the game played in every period. It is meant to describe
the basic strategic interaction within each period.
The inﬁnitely repeated version of G (plus monitoring activity) with dis-
counting and observation costs is denoted by Γ(δ, λ), where δ = (δ1, . . . , δn) ∈
(0, 1)n is a vector of discount factors and λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Rn++ is a vec-
tor of observation costs. We permit diﬀerential discount factors.5 In each
period, each player simultaneously chooses an action ai ∈ Ai and then de-
cides whether to privately observe the actions that the other players chose
in the period. For each player i, λi denotes the cost of observing the others’
actions. We also assume that if player i does not monitor the other players
at the end of a period, then no information about the action proﬁle of the
other players in the period is revealed to player i. Each player’s monitor-
ing decision itself is assumed to be private and not observable to the other
players. Hence player i’s private information on the play of a given past
period can be represented by a pair of her chosen action and observations,
(ai, ωi) ∈ Ai × (A−i ∪ {φ}). Here, (ai, ωi) = (ai, a−i) means that player i
chose ai, monitored the other players, and observed a−i. On the other hand,
(ai, ωi) = (ai, φ) means that player i chose ai and did not monitor the other
players.
5As Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) show, when discount factors are heterogeneous, payoﬀ
vectors outside V might be feasible. However, the present paper concentrates on sustaining
payoﬀ vectors in V for expositional simplicity. We consider diﬀerential discount factors
only to demonstrate that our analysis does not require identical discount factors, although
our construction can be used to sustain payoﬀ vectors outside V .
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We assume that monitoring is the only way to obtain information about
the other players’ past actions. This implies that the players do not receive
the stage payoﬀs in each period, but receive them in total at the “end” of
the repeated game. Of course, the inﬁnitely repeated game never ends un-
der the basic interpretation of the game. However, if we regard each δi as
a (subjective) probability with which the game continues, then the inter-
pretation about the timing of receiving payoﬀ is less problematic. Anyway,
this assumption is extreme, and it is assumed to make the issue of costly
monitoring as stark as possible (and partly for analytical simplicity). In
Section 6, we brieﬂy comment on what happens if payoﬀs are received in
each period, in which case realized payoﬀs give players information about
the others’ actions.
We also assume that there exists a public randomization device which
generates a sunspot according to the uniform distribution over the unit
interval [0, 1]. At the beginning of each period, a sunspot is realized and
observed by the players before they choose their actions. The (private)
history for player i at the beginning of period t before she chooses an action
is denoted by hti and deﬁned as the sequence of her private information and
realized sunspots up to the beginning of the period. Thus, the set of all
possible histories for player i at period t is deﬁned by Hti = [0, 1]
t × (Ai ×
(A−i∪{φ}))t−1, where H1i is equivalent to the set of sunspots. Then the set
of possible histories for player i is Hi = ∪∞t=1Hti .
Player i’s strategy σi is a function from Hi to Si × [0, 1]|Ai| where |Ai|
is the cardinality of Ai. Thus, for any history hti ∈ Hi, we have σi(hti) =
(si(t), {li(ai, hti)}ai∈Ai), where si(t) is player i’s (possibly mixed) action in
period t given hti, and li(ai, h
t
i) is the probability that player i monitors
the other players given that the history is hti and she played ai in period t.
Player i’s payoﬀs in Γ(δ, λ) are the average (expected) discounted sum of
the stage game payoﬀs minus observation costs. Formally, player i’s payoﬀs
under a strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) are denoted by gi(σ) and given by





ui(a(t))− λi · li(ai(t), hti) | σ
]
,
where E[ · | σ] denotes the expectation with respect to the probability
measure over histories induced by strategy proﬁle σ.
3 Deﬁnitions
This section introduces some deﬁnitions which facilitate subsequent analysis.
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Let the stage game G = {n,A, (ui)ni=1} be given. For a given (possibly
mixed) action proﬁle s ∈ S for G, we deﬁne
BRi(s) = {a′i ∈ Ai : ui(a′i, s−i) ≥ ui(ai, s−i) ∀ai ∈ Ai},
which is the set of (pure-action) best responses of player i against s−i. For
a given (pure) action proﬁle a ∈ A, we deﬁne
Bi(a) = {a′i ∈ Ai : ui(a′i, a−i) > ui(a)},
which is the set of (strictly) better replies to a−i;
D(a) = {i : ai /∈ BRi(a)},
which is the set of players for whom ai is not a best response to a−i;
Dw (a) = {i : BRi(a) = {ai}},
which is the set of players for whom ai is not a unique best response to a−i;
and
SD(a) = {i : BRi(a′) = {ai} ∀a′ ∈ A},
which is the set of players for whom ai is the strictly dominant action.
Let NE (G) be the set of (mixed) Nash equilibria of G. A penal code
is a proﬁle of Nash equilibria, (sˆ(i))ni=1, where sˆ(i) ∈ NE (G) for each i ∈
{1, . . . , n}.6 We allow sˆ(i) = sˆ(j) for some i and j = i.
Given a penal code (sˆ(i))ni=1, let E1 ⊆ A be the set of all action proﬁles
a ∈ A such that for some player i,
(1-i) D(a) = {i},
(1-ii) for all j = i, BRj(a) ∩ BRj(sˆ(i)) = ∅, and
(1-iii) there exist a′i ∈ Bi(a) and ζ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all j = i,
aj ∈ BRj((1− ζ)ai + ζa′i, a−i). (1)
Next, let E2 ⊆ A be the set of all action proﬁles a ∈ A such that for
some players i and j = i,
(2-i) {i, j} ⊆ D(a),
6This terminology follows Abreu (1988), although our use of the term is slightly diﬀer-
ent: while Abreu (1988) used the term for a proﬁle of repeated game equilibria, we use it
for a proﬁle of stage game equilibria.
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(2-iii) for all k /∈ {i, j} ∪ SD(a), ak /∈ BRk(sˆ(i)) ∩ BRk(sˆ(j)).
For a given a ∈ E2, players i and j for whom (2-i)–(2-iii) hold are called
associated players. For a given a ∈ E2, there may exist more than one pair
of associated players, but we select a pair {i, j} arbitrarily for each a ∈ E2
and denote the selected pair by AP(a). Similarly, for each a ∈ E1 and i
such that {i} = D(a), we let AP(a) = {i}. Let E = E1 ∪ E2.
Given a penal code (sˆ(i))ni=1, we say that a payoﬀ vector v = (vi)
n
i=1 ∈ Rn
is supportable with respect to (sˆ(i))ni=1, if there exists a probability distri-
bution on E, denoted (ρ(a))a∈E , such that
(s-i) for any i, vi =
∑
a∈E ρ(a)ui(a),
(s-ii) for any i, if there exists a ∈ E1 such that ρ(a) > 0 and D(a) = {i},
then vi > ui(sˆ(i)),
(s-iii) for any i, if there exists a ∈ E2 such that ρ(a) > 0 and i ∈ Dw (a),
then vi > ui(sˆ(i)), and
(s-iv) for any a ∈ E2 such that ρ(a) > 0 and any k ∈ SD(a), if there exists
aˆ ∈ E such that ρ(aˆ) > 0 and aˆk = ak, then there exists such an aˆ
that satisﬁes either aˆ ∈ E2 or [aˆ ∈ E1(k) and aˆ′k = ak] where aˆ′k is a
better reply that satisﬁes (1-iii) with respect to aˆ.
Note that in (s-iii), i is not required to be an associated player. Condi-
tion (s-iv) says that if there exists a player k who plays her dominant action
in some a ∈ E2 in the support of ρ but does not play it in some aˆ ∈ E in
the support, then either there exists such an aˆ in E2, or there exists such
an aˆ ∈ E1(k) such that an associated better reply that satisﬁes (1-iii) is not
the dominant action of the player. This technical condition is irrelevant for
many cases. For example, if no one plays her dominant action (if any) in
the support of ρ, then (s-iv) is trivially satisﬁed. Note also that if two or
more players have a dominant action in the stage game, then E1 is empty
by (1-ii) and therefore (s-iv) holds for any ρ.
Let V ∗ ⊆ V denote the set of supportable payoﬀ vectors with respect to
a given penal code (sˆ(i))ni=1.
7
7When the penal code is understood, we simply call V ∗ the set of supportable payoﬀ
vectors.
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4 A Characterization of Equilibrium Payoﬀ Vec-
tors
We are now ready to state our main result, which gives a suﬃcient condition
for a given payoﬀ vector to be approximated by a sequential equilibrium
when the observation costs (λi)ni=1 are suﬃciently small and the discount
factors (δi)ni=1 are suﬃciently close to one.
Proposition 1 Let (sˆ(i))ni=1 be a penal code and V
∗ be the set of supportable
payoﬀ vectors with respect to the penal code. Then for any v ∈ V ∗ and any
 > 0, there exist λ¯ = (λ¯i)ni=1 ∈ Rn++ and δ = (δi)ni=1 ∈ (0, 1)n such that, for
any game Γ(δ, λ) with δ ≥ δ and λ ≤ λ¯, there exists a sequential equilibrium
σ∗ that satisﬁes |gi(σ∗)− vi| <  for any i.
Proof. See the Appendix.
While the proof in the Appendix provides a general construction of an
equilibrium that approximates a given supportable payoﬀ vector, we here
give its main idea, restricting ourselves to special examples of supportable
payoﬀ vectors. Let us begin with the simplest case, which is to approximate
a payoﬀ vector that is equal to u(a) for some a ∈ E2 such that Dw (a) =
{1, 2, . . . , n}. Since a ∈ E2, there exist a pair of associated players {i, j} =
AP(a) and better replies {a′i, a′j} of them such that (2-i)–(2-iii) hold. Since
Dw (a) = {1, 2, . . . , n}, supportability implies vk > uk(sˆ(k)) for all k. Thus
the penal code Nash equilibrium for player k, sˆ(k), indeed makes k suﬀer.
To simplify our exposition, we call action ak “cooperation,” action a′k
given by (2-ii) “minor-deviation,” and any other action “major-deviation.”
Note that only the associated players {i, j} = AP(a) can minor-deviate.
We construct a strategy proﬁle that uses n + 1 states. The set of states
is {0, 1, . . . , n}. State 0 is regarded as the cooperative state, in which (i)
each player k ∈ {i, j} randomizes between cooperation and minor-deviation,
where the probability of cooperation is suﬃciently close to 1, (ii) all other
players k /∈ {i, j} cooperate, and (iii) all players monitor the other players.
On the other hand, in state i ≥ 1, player i is punished; the players play sˆ(i)
and no one monitors the others.
We now specify the rule that governs the transition of states. The initial
state is 0 (cooperative state). If the state is 0 in period t− 1, then period t
is in
(i) state k if player k ∈ {1, . . . , n} is the only player who major-deviated,
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(ii) state k if player k ∈ {i, j} minor-deviated and all other players coop-
erated, and
(iii) state 0 otherwise.
For any k ≥ 1, if the state moves to k because of a unilateral major-deviation
of player k (case (i)), then the state remains k for all subsequent periods.
On the other hand, if the state moves to k because of a unilateral minor-
deviation of player k ∈ {i, j} (case (ii)), then state remains k for a certain
number of periods and then moves back to 0. The length of the k-state
periods is set so that the gain from the minor-deviation is exactly equal to
the loss from playing sˆ(k). Since uk(a) > uk(sˆ(k)), the appropriate length of
the k-state periods can be found if the players are suﬃciently patient. Since
the appropriate length is not necessarily an integer, the public randomiza-
tion device is used to make the transition from state k to 0 contingent on
sunspots. Moreover, since when the state moves back to 0 depends only
on sunspots, the state is common knowledge although the players do not
monitor each other during the punishment periods.
This speciﬁcation is suﬃcient to determine what happens on the path.
Since the players cooperate with a probability suﬃciently close to 1, the
path approximates the payoﬀ vector u(a) as long as the observation costs
are suﬃciently small. Note that the above speciﬁcation also determines
the continuation play at oﬀ-the-path histories if the player did not deviate
in terms of monitoring in the previous periods (since then she knows the
state). To deﬁne the equilibrium strategy formally, it remains to specify
how a player behaves after she deviates in terms of monitoring. However,
since this speciﬁcation does not aﬀect the following argument, we do not
complete the speciﬁcation of strategy here.
Let us now examine the incentive to follow the state-dependent play de-
scribed above. First, for δ suﬃciently close to the unit vector, no player has
an incentive to major-deviate in state 0. This is because uk(a) > uk(sˆ(k))
for all k and once player k major-deviates, the resulting outcome is the
perpetual play of sˆ(k). Second, players k ∈ {i, j} are indiﬀerent between
cooperation and minor-deviation because of the way in which the number
of k-state periods is set. Third, in state k ≥ 1, no player has an incentive to
deviate in terms of action or monitoring since (i) a stage game Nash equilib-
rium is played, (ii) the play does not aﬀect the transition of the state, and
(iii) no monitoring is required.
The remaining step is to examine the monitoring incentive in state 0.
We start with players k /∈ {i, j}. Suppose that the state was 0 in period t
and player k /∈ {i, j} did not monitor at the end of the period. Then,
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in period t + 1, she is uncertain about the state, which is either 0, i, or j
depending on whether i or j (or both) minor-deviated in period t. By (2-iii),
playing ak in period t+ 1 is not optimal if the state is either i or j. On the
other hand, if player k plays an action other than ak in period t+1, the action
is considered as a major-deviation and triggers a perpetual punishment if
the state is actually 0. Therefore, if λk is suﬃciently small, the gain from
eliminating the uncertainty exceeds the cost of monitoring.
Let us now consider a player k ∈ {i, j}. Without loss of generality, let
k = i. Suppose that the state was 0 in period t and player i did not monitor
at the end of the period, so i is uncertain about the state in period t + 1.
First, consider the case in which player i cooperated in period t. Then the
state in period t + 1 is either j or 0 depending on the action of player j
in period t. Thus, if i cooperates or minor-deviates in period t + 1, then
by (2-ii), the action is suboptimal if the state is j. On the other hand,
if i major-deviates in period t + 1, a perpetual punishment follows if the
actual state is 0. Hence, player i suﬀers strictly from the uncertainty and
it is optimal for her to eliminate the uncertainty if her monitoring cost is
suﬃciently small.
Let us now consider the case when player i minor-deviated in period t.
Then the state in period t + 1 is either i or 0; the latter occurs if j also
minor-deviated. Since the latter case occurs with a small probability, the
state in period t + 1 is almost surely i, so by (2-ii), it is suboptimal for i to
either cooperate or minor-deviate in period t + 1. However, if she chooses
an action other than cooperation and minor-deviation in period t + 1, then
it is regarded as a major-deviation if the state in this period is actually 0,
which occurs with a small but positive probability. Thus, player i suﬀers
strictly from the uncertainty, which she is willing to avoid if her monitoring
cost is suﬃciently small.
In this way, we can prove that it is not proﬁtable for players to devi-
ate in terms of monitoring (on the path). This together with the previous
arguments shows that the state-dependent play is an equilibrium when the
players are patient and monitoring costs are small.
It is less straightforward to approximate other supportable payoﬀ vec-
tors. For example, let us consider a payoﬀ vector that is equal to u(a) for
some a ∈ E1. By (1-i), only one player has a short-run incentive to deviate
from a. The state-dependent play described above cannot be used since it
requires two players to minor-deviate (to give monitoring incentives to each
of them). Therefore, we consider a diﬀerent type of behavior in this case.
Speciﬁcally, in the cooperative state, the player i such that D(a) = {i}
randomizes between cooperation and minor-deviation and does not monitor
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the other players, while all other players cooperate and monitor the others.
The state transition is speciﬁed similarly. Then, all agents j = i have a
monitoring incentive in the cooperative state since the future play is either
to cooperate or to punish i and the state transition depends on i’s action.
On the other hand, since the state transition depends only on i’s action, i
can identify the current state even if she does not monitor the other players.
Thus, at equilibrium, the state is common knowledge among the players
although not all players observe the past actions.
The construction of an equilibrium is more complicated if the payoﬀ
vector to be approximated can be generated only by a randomization among
elements of E1 and E2, or when some players play a dominant action in the
cooperative stage. We deal with these cases in the Appendix.
A ﬁnal remark on Proposition 1 is that if the players use sunspots wisely,
many other payoﬀ vectors can be approximated. Let NE ∗(G) be the set of
Nash equilibrium payoﬀ vectors of G. Then it is easily seen that any payoﬀ
vector in the convex hull of V ∗ ∪ NE ∗(G) can be approximated. Moreover,
as we vary the penal code (sˆ(i))ni=1, we obtain diﬀerent V
∗ and therefore
diﬀerent V ∗ ∪NE ∗(G), and all elements of those sets can be approximated.
Thus, if G has a number of Nash equilibria, the set of payoﬀ vectors that
our construction can approximate can be large.8 In the next section, we
demonstrate that the set is indeed large and yields an approximate Folk
Theorem.
5 Application: Approximate Folk Theorem
This section examines three examples and shows that Proposition 1 gener-
ates an approximate Nash Folk Theorem in each of the examples. In these
examples, we consider a penal code in which the same Nash equilibrium is
used for all players. Denoting the stage Nash equilibrium by sˆ, we will show
that all eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors that Pareto-dominate u(sˆ) are supportable
with respect to sˆ. Then, Proposition 1 proves that all those payoﬀ vectors
are approximated by equilibria if the monitoring costs are suﬃciently small.
Since sunspots are available, all interior payoﬀ vectors that Pareto-dominate
u(sˆ) are also attainable as equilibria. In this way, we obtain an approximate
Nash Folk Theorem. A minimax version of approximate Folk Theorem may
also hold if, in addition, ui(sˆ) is the minimax value of player i for all i.
We indeed obtain an approximate minimax Folk Theorem in the example of
8Furthermore, there may be payoﬀ vectors that can be supported by other strategy
proﬁles than the ones we consider in this paper.
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linear partnership examined below.
5.1 A Variant of Prisoners’ Dilemma
We begin our discussion with the following standard prisoners’ dilemma.
C D
C 1, 1 −1, 2
D 2,−1 0, 0
If this is the stage game, then our construction of strategy proﬁle cannot
support cooperation. Indeed, since the Nash equilibrium is unique, the only
possible penal code is sˆ(1) = sˆ(2) = (D,D). Then, (C,C) violates (1-i) and
(2-ii). Condition (2-ii) is simply impossible to satisfy if there are only two
actions. Similarly, (C,D) and (D,C) violate (1-ii) and (2-i). Thus E1 and
E2 are empty for the prisoners’ dilemma.
On the other hand, the result changes considerably if the stage game
has a slightly larger action set. For prisoners’ dilemma, our construction
can easily support cooperation if each player has another action. This is
illustrated by the following stage game.
C D E
C 1, 1 −1, 2 −1,−1
D 2,−1 0, 0 −1,−1
E −1,−1 −1,−1 0, 0
This is a simpliﬁed version of the bilateral trade game with moral hazard in
Bhaskar and van Damme (2002). This game has two pure Nash equilibria,
(D,D) and (E,E), as well as a mixed Nash equilibrium, s, where each player
randomizes between D and E with equal probabilities. Clearly, C is strictly
dominated, and (C,C) Pareto-dominates all Nash equilibria.
We present an approximate Nash Folk Theorem for the expanded pris-
oners’ dilemma. We set sˆ(1) = sˆ(2) = (E,E) as a penal code. Then, since
neither C nor D is a best response to E, we have (C,C) ∈ E2. Further-
more, since D is a unique best response to C, we also have (C,D) ∈ E1 and
(D,C) ∈ E1. Since no player has a dominant action, Condition (s-iv) of
supportability holds trivially. Since (C,C), (D,C), and (C,D) are the only
eﬃcient action proﬁles, any eﬃcient payoﬀ vector that Pareto-dominates
(0, 0) is supportable and therefore approximated by an equilibrium. Thus
an approximate Nash Folk Theorem holds.
However, this is not an approximate minimax Folk Theorem since the
minimax value in this game is −1/2 for each player. The fact that the
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minimax value is attained by the mixed Nash equilibrium s does not enable
us to prove a minimax Folk Theorem. Indeed, if we set sˆ(1) = sˆ(2) = s
as a penal code, then E1 and E2 are both empty, and so is the set of
supportable payoﬀ vectors with respect to the penal code. This argument
also demonstrates that the set of supportable payoﬀ vectors depends on the
penal code.
5.2 Linear Partnership Games
This subsection further explores the idea that our construction of strategy
proﬁle can support cooperation if the action space is suﬃciently rich. We
consider a class of linear partnership games where each game is parame-
terized by the richness of action set. The assumption of linearity plays an
important expositional role; it ensures that the set of feasible payoﬀ vectors,
V , does not depend on the richness of action set. At the cost of complication,
the idea can be extended to more general games of partnership.
The linear n-player partnership game is deﬁned as follows. There are
n players, and each player has m+1 actions where m ≥ 2. The set of actions
for each player is Ai = {0, 1/m, . . . , (m−1)/m, 1}. The production function
is linear and given by f(a) =
∑n
i=1 ai. Let ci(ai) = αai be the cost that
player i has to pay if she chooses ai. The output is divided equally among
the players. Player i’s payoﬀs are therefore ui(a) = (1/n)
∑n
k=1 ak−αai. We
impose the non-triviality assumption that 1/n < α < 1. This implies that
ai = 0 is a dominant action for each player, while (1, 1, . . . , 1) is the eﬃcient
action proﬁle. Hence, this game is also a variant of prisoners’ dilemma.
Note also that any ai ≥ 1/m is strictly dominated by ai − (1/m). The
minimax value for each player is 0, which is attained in the unique Nash
equilibrium s0 = (0, . . . , 0), independently of m.
Since the partnership game has a unique Nash equilibrium, the only
possible penal code is sˆ(i) = s0 for all i. With respect to the penal code,
E1 = ∅ by (1-ii). This implies that (s-iv) holds trivially. On the other hand,
E2 is characterized as follows.
Proposition 2 E2 = {a ∈ A : ∃i, j = i s.t. min{ai, aj} ≥ 2/m}.
Proof. Let a ∈ A be such that min{ai, aj} ≥ 2/m for some i and j = i.
Then, {i, j} ⊆ D(a), and for all k ∈ {i, j}, 1/m ∈ Bk(a) \ {0}. For all
k /∈ {i, j} ∪ SD(a), ak ≥ 1/m and hence ak /∈ BRk(s0). Therefore (2-i)–
(2-iii) hold and a ∈ E2.
To prove the converse, let a ∈ E2. Then there exist associated players i
and j = i for whom there exist a′i ∈ Bi(a) \ {0} and a′j ∈ Bj(a) \ {0}. Hence
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min{ai, aj} ≥ 2/m. Q.E.D.
Let V¯ be the boundary of V , and VIR ⊆ V be the set of feasible payoﬀ
vectors that are strictly individually rational, i.e., VIR = {v ∈ V : vi >
0 for all i}. Since payoﬀ functions are linear, V , V¯ , and VIR are all in-
dependent of m. The following result proves that all feasible, boundary,
and strictly individually rational payoﬀ vectors are supportable if m is suf-
ﬁciently large. In view of Proposition 1 and the availability of sunspots, the
result implies that if m is large, any v ∈ VIR can be approximated by an
equilibrium. Therefore, we have an approximate minimax Folk Theorem.
Proposition 3 If m ≥ 2/(nα− 1), any v ∈ VIR ∩ V¯ is supportable.
Proof. Assume m ≥ 2/(nα − 1) and let v ∈ VIR ∩ V¯ . Then there exists





a∈A ρ(a)ai, which is the expected action level of player i. Since
v ∈ VIR ∩ V¯ , there exists a player i such that ρ∗i = 1 (otherwise, a Pareto
improvement can be achieved by multiplying everyone’s expected action
level by some β > 1). Without loss of generality, we assume ρ∗1 = 1. If∑
k≥2 ρ
∗




ρ∗i − α < (1/n)(1 + 2/m)− α ≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from m ≥ 2/(nα − 1). The inequalities




We have to show that there exists a probability distribution over E2
that generates payoﬀ vector v. Since payoﬀ functions are linear, it suﬃces
to prove that the convex hull of E2 includes ρ∗ = (ρ∗i )
n
i=1. To prove this, let
βH and βL be deﬁned by
βH = 1/(max
k≥2




ρ∗k ≤ 1, (3)
where the inequality in (3) is proved in the previous paragraph. Let ρH , ρL ∈
[0, 1]n be deﬁned by ρH1 = ρ
L
1 = 1, and for all k ≥ 2, ρHk = βHρ∗k and
ρLk = β
Lρ∗k. Clearly, ρ
∗ is a convex combination of ρH and ρL. By (2), ρH
has at least two components of 1. Thus, it follows easily from Proposition 2
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that ρH is in the convex hull of E2. We now prove that ρL is also in the
convex hull of E2. For each k ≥ 2, let ak ∈ A be the action proﬁle deﬁned by
ak1 = 1, a
k
k = 2/m, and a
k
j = 0 for all j /∈ {1, k}. By Proposition 2, ak ∈ E2
for each k ≥ 2. By (3), ρL is a convex combination of (ak)k≥2 where the





5.3 Games with Utility Burning
The objective of this subsection is to demonstrate that an approximate Nash
Folk Theorem holds if the players are able to “burn” small amounts of their
own payoﬀs.
Let a stage game G = {n,A, (ui)ni=1} be given. For a given number z > 0,
we deﬁne the game with z-utility burning as Gz = {n,A′, (u′i)ni=1} where
A′i = Ai×{0, 1, 2} for each i, and for any action proﬁle a′ = (ai, ki)ni=1 ∈ A′,
u′i(a
′) = ui(a)− kiz.
In this game, each player chooses an action and at the same time chooses
the amount of her payoﬀs to burn. It is assumed that a player can decrease
her payoﬀs without aﬀecting the others’. We also assume that if a player
monitors the other players, she learns the amounts of payoﬀs that the other
players burnt.
It is easily seen that none of the Nash equilibria in Gz involves utility
burning. Note also that G and Gz have the same Pareto frontier. Moreover,
if we deﬁne V z = co{u′(a′) : a′ = (ai, 2)ni=1}, then V z converges to V as
z → 0. Let us ﬁx a penal code (in Gz), (sˆ′(i))ni=1, arbitrarily and consider
an action proﬁle a′ ∈ A′ of the form a′ = (ai, 2)ni=1. Then for all i, we
have (ai, 1) ∈ Bi(a′) and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all k ∈ {1, 2}, (ai, k) /∈
BRi(sˆ′(j)), which implies a′ ∈ E2. Therefore, any v ∈ V z that Pareto-
dominates (ui(sˆ′(i)))ni=1 is supportable.
9 Hence, if the unit of utility burning,
z, is small, an approximate Nash Folk Theorem holds.10 Note that this result
holds for any game G.
6 Concluding Remarks
This section discusses possible extensions of our model.
9Since v is represented by a convex combination of elements of E2, Conditions (s-ii)
and (s-iv) hold trivially.
10However, to sustain cooperation, the observation costs have to be small in comparison
with the already small level of utility burning.
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6.1 Fixed Observation Costs
An important assumption in our characterization of equilibrium payoﬀ vec-
tors and approximate Folk Theorems is that the observation costs are suﬃ-
ciently small. The results say nothing if the levels of observation costs are
ﬁxed. A simple, alternative framework in which we can deal with ﬁxed levels
of observation costs is one in which monitoring at the end of a period gives
information about not only the present period but all the previous periods.
This framework is a variation of that in Miyahara (2002), who examines
the case when at least the last two periods can be observed. However,
Miyahara’s eﬃciency result for repeated prisoners’ dilemma also requires
small observation costs.
When all previous periods are observable (with costs), we can use
Miyahara’s construction of strategy proﬁle to support a large set of pay-
oﬀ vectors for ﬁxed observation costs. To see this, assume that there exists
an action proﬁle aˆ that attains a given target payoﬀ vector. Let us also
assume the existence of an action proﬁle a in which there exist at least two
potential deviators, i.e., |D(a)| ≥ 2. As in our construction, select two play-
ers {i, j} ⊆ D(a) and call them the associated players. Then consider the
following strategy proﬁle for a given T ∈ {2, 3, . . .}: (i) the players play aˆ
in the ﬁrst T − 1 periods without monitoring each other; (ii) in period T ,
the players play a, except that the associated players mix between a and
their minor-deviations, and all players monitor; (iii) the play in the next T
periods is either another sequence of (i) and (ii), or a repetition of a penal
code Nash equilibrium, depending on the presence of a deviator in the ﬁrst
T periods, and so on.
Under the strategy proﬁle, the players do not monitor the other players
in aˆ state. But they have no incentive to deviate in terms of actions since
deviations are detected at least T periods later and regarded as major-
deviations. The incentive for monitoring in period T is guaranteed if for
each player k, aˆk is not a best response to the penal code Nash equilibria
designed for the associated players. Under this condition, the above strategy
proﬁle constitutes an equilibrium and approximates the target payoﬀ vector
for a given vector of observation costs if T is suﬃciently large and discount
factors are close to 1.11
11In the strategy proﬁle, the action proﬁle is the same for the ﬁrst T − 1 periods.
Alternatively, we could consider a strategy proﬁle in which the action proﬁle during these
periods is time-dependent. The advantage of using the larger class of strategy proﬁles is
that the corresponding condition on the relation between “aˆ” and the penal code can be
weakened considerably.
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This construction for multi-period observation technology can sustain
cooperation even for stage games whose action sets are small. Indeed, the
stage game examined in Miyahara (2002) is the standard two-action prison-
ers’ dilemma and he obtains an eﬃciency result for the game.
In our future research, we will elaborate the strategy proﬁle (along the
line mentioned in footnote 11) to obtain a characterization of payoﬀ vectors
that can be approximated by equilibria and derive conditions on stage games
for which a Folk Theorem with ﬁxed observation costs holds.
6.2 Timing of Receiving Payoﬀs
We have assumed that the players do not receive payoﬀs in each period
but they receive the total payoﬀs when the game ends. We need these
assumptions in order to keep consistency with the assumption that, without
paying monitoring costs, a player receives no information about the others’
actions. If payoﬀs are received in every period, then they generally provide
players with some information about the other players’ actions.
However, we can imagine a framework in which payoﬀs are received in
every period but monitoring remains important because realized payoﬀs are
only a noisy signal of the other players’ actions. For example, let a stage
game G = {n,A, (ui)ni=1} be given. Suppose that at the end of each period,
player i receives payoﬀs of ui(a)+ i if a ∈ A is played in that period, where
i is a noise term which follows a normal distribution with mean 0. Assume
also that the noise terms are independent across the players.
In this formulation, the realized payoﬀ is not a sure indicator of the
other players’ actions while it is informative. If we ignore the issue of costly
observation, the standard model of repeated games with imperfect private
monitoring (like Sekiguchi (1997)) falls into this category if the realized
payoﬀ is a suﬃcient statistic of the privately observed signal about the other
players’ actions.
Even in this framework, we can use the state-dependent strategy proﬁle
considered in Section 4. Under this strategy proﬁle, players monitor each
other and do not use the information contained in the realized payoﬀs. The
monitoring incentive is weaker under this strategy proﬁle since realized pay-
oﬀs also give players information about the state. However, players who do
not pay observation costs are not able to determine the state with certainty.
Therefore, if the likelihood ratio of any pair of action proﬁles that generate
the same level of payoﬀs is bounded away from zero, then the players do
have an incentive to pay observation costs, given any payoﬀ realization, if
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the observation costs are suﬃciently small.12 Hence the basic idea of our
construction also applies to the case in which payoﬀs are received in each
period.
This observation is important because it suggests a possibility that costly
observation is one comprehensive solution to the private monitoring prob-
lem. The literature of repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
has shown diﬃculty in constructing a cooperative/eﬃcient equilibrium, and
the existing positive results (reported in the papers cited in footnote 2) are
limited to simple speciﬁc games, e.g., repeated prisoners’ dilemma and its
variations.13 It is still unknown whether a Folk Theorem or an eﬃciency
result holds in general settings with private monitoring. In contrast, our
result and the above discussions show that an approximate Folk Theorem
does hold in general environments if the players have an ability to observe
the other players’ actions directly and the observation costs are suﬃciently
small.
The literature also identiﬁes communication among the players as a driv-
ing force to cooperation in general environments with private monitoring
(Compte (1998), Kandori and Matsushima (1998), and Aoyagi (2002)).14
Thus our analysis may as well be seen as demonstrating that costly obser-
vation is a convenient substitute for communication. This interpretation
has a strong implication on antitrust laws since they control communication
among ﬁrms in the belief that communication is a major tool that facilitates
cartels.
6.3 Partial Monitoring
The monitoring activity that we have considered has a binary aspect in that
each player has to decide whether to obtain complete information about the
action proﬁle of the other players in the period or to obtain no information.
A more realistic formulation is that each player can choose to what
extent she observes the other players’ actions, and the more she spends for
12Precisely speaking, the likelihood ratio is not bounded away from zero when the noise
terms are normally distributed. However, the likelihood ratio is close to zero only at
the tails. Hence, we conjecture that there exists a cooperative equilibrium in which the
players monitor each other unless the realized payoﬀs take extreme values. Moreover, the
likelihood ratio condition can be satisﬁed for other speciﬁcations of the noise term.
13Mailath and Morris (2002) consider more general stage games, but they assume that
private signals are correlated across the players. Amarante (2002) also conducts a general
analysis. For some negative results, see Matsushima (1991) and Compte (2002).
14See also Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) for the role of communication in related
environments with private monitoring.
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monitoring, the more information she obtains. For example, suppose that
λi is the unit monitoring cost and player i incurs the cost of mλi if she
monitors m of the other players. This alternative framework is relevant in
the price-setting oligopoly if the goods are sold at each ﬁrm’s own outlet.
In this framework, each ﬁrm decides the set of ﬁrms to monitor and the
total observation cost depends on the number of ﬁrms to monitor. Such
partial monitoring is relevant even in the case of duopoly if the ﬁrms operate
in multiple markets. In this case, each ﬁrm decides the set of markets to
monitor, and the total observation cost depends on the number of markets to
monitor. Thus the price-setting oligopoly is a prominent example of partial
monitoring since the ﬁrms often compete in a large number of dimensions.
As Stigler (1964) concluded, collusion is hard to implement since it requires
an ability to detect any possible secret price-cuts in any market.
In general, partial monitoring is relevant whenever the action proﬁle of
n − 1 players is multi-dimensional (this is trivially the case when n ≥ 3)
and a player can choose to observe only a subset of the coordinates in the
proﬁle of the other players’ actions. A basic diﬃculty in analyzing the case
when partial monitoring is feasible is that the players have an incentive to
economize on observation expenses by not monitoring some of the players
(or markets). In the strategy proﬁle used in our proof, some of the players
do not randomize in the cooperative state, but this is not a problem in the
proof since these players are also monitored by the other players. Under the
binary nature of our monitoring technology, any player who has an incentive
to monitor at least one of the other players has no choice but to monitor
all other players. However, if partial monitoring is feasible, players would
monitor only those who randomize, but then deviations of non-randomizing
players are not detected. Therefore, if partial monitoring is feasible, the
cooperative equilibria that we constructed are upset.
Nevertheless, our construction can be modiﬁed to deal with partial mon-
itoring if the payoﬀ vector to be approximated can be generated by action
proﬁles in which all players have proper minor-deviations. Formally, let a
stage game G and a penal code (sˆ(k))nk=1 be given. Let En ⊆ A be the set
of all a ∈ A such that
(n-i) D(a) = {1, 2, . . . , n},







It is then not very diﬃcult to see that for all a ∈ En, if ui(a) > ui(sˆ(i))
for all i, then u(a) can be approximated by an equilibrium, in which all
players randomize between ai and a′i in the cooperative state. Thus, any
convex combination of such u(a)’s can be also approximated. We have seen
in Subsection 5.2 that the ﬁner the action set is, the more payoﬀ vectors
are approximated using action proﬁles where all players have short-run in-
centives to deviate. Therefore, our result extends to the case of partial
monitoring when the underlying strategic situation involves suﬃciently ﬁne
action sets.
This idea also applies to the case of duopoly with multiple markets. If a
price proﬁle is such that each ﬁrm has a short-run incentive to deviate in ev-
ery market, then the price proﬁle can be supported by an equilibrium where
the ﬁrms randomize between cooperation and minor-deviation in every mar-
ket. Again, if the price space is suﬃciently ﬁne, many levels of collusion can
be sustained, so an approximate Folk Theorem will be obtained.
6.4 Finite Repetition
Assuming that the horizon is ﬁnite has both an advantage and a disadvan-
tage. An advantage is that the ﬁnite horizon makes it easier to interpret
the assumption that the payoﬀs are received in total at the end of the re-
peated game. A disadvantage is that the ﬁnite horizon makes cooperation
unsustainable if the stage game has a unique equilibrium.
On the other hand, it might be possible to obtain an approximate Folk
Theorem under a ﬁnite horizon if the stage game has multiple equilibrium
payoﬀs for each player as in Benoit and Krishna (1985). We conjecture that
if the number of periods is suﬃciently large, an action proﬁle that Pareto-
dominates a stage-game equilibrium can be sustained in early periods. This
is another topic of our future research.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Let v ∈ V ∗ and  > 0. Since v is supportable, there exists a probability
distribution on E, denoted (ρ(a))a∈E , such that (s-i)–(s-iv) hold. Let us
deﬁne E∗1(i) = {a ∈ E1 : ρ(a) > 0 and D(a) = {i}}, E∗1 = ∪iE∗1(i), E∗2 =
{a ∈ E2 : ρ(a) > 0}, and E∗ = E∗1 ∪ E∗2 . Thus, E∗ is the support of ρ.
We can choose a suﬃciently small  > 0 so that for all players i, if there
exists a ∈ E∗ such that either [a ∈ E1 and D(a) = {i}] or [a ∈ E2 and
i ∈ Dw (a)], then vi −  > ui(sˆ(i)). This is possible since v is supportable.
Let SD∗ = {i : i ∈ SD(a) ∀a ∈ E∗} be the set of players i such that
for all a, aˆ ∈ E∗, ai = aˆi and it is the strictly dominant action for i.
For each i and a ∈ E∗1(i), ﬁx a′i ∈ Bi(a) such that (1-iii) and (s-iv) hold.
Similarly, for each a ∈ E∗2 , we ﬁx a′i ∈ Bi(a) and a′j ∈ Bj(a) that satisfy
(2-ii), where {i, j} = AP(a).
Since G is a ﬁnite game, there exists ζ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all a ∈ E∗1 ,
(1-iii) holds with ζ = ζ¯, and for all a ∈ E2 and all k /∈ Dw (a),
{ak} = BRk((1− ζ¯)ai + ζ¯a′i, (1− ζ¯)aj + ζ¯a′j , a−i−j), (4)
where {i, j} = AP(a). Note that these conditions also hold when ζ¯ is
replaced with any ζ ∈ [0, ζ¯).
Let η ∈ [0, ζ¯], λi ≥ 0, and δi ∈ (0, 1) for all i. For any a ∈ E∗ and any
k ∈ AP(a), we deﬁne a mixed action aηk as
aηk = (1− η)ak + ηa′k,
with the obvious interpretation that aηk assigns probability 1− η to ak and
the remaining probability to a′k. We now deﬁne the following vectors and
numbers: V 0 ∈ Rn, V 0(a) ∈ Rn, V k(a) ∈ Rn, and νk(a) ∈ (0, 1) for any






V 0i (a) = (1− δi)ui(a) + δiV 0i (6)
= (1− δi)ui(a′i, a−i) + δiV ii (a) (7)
for any i and any a ∈ E∗1(i);












for any i, any a ∈ E∗1(i), and any k = i;
V i(a) = [1− νi(a)]u(sˆ(i)) + νi(a)V 0 (9)
for any i and any a ∈ E∗1(i);










































(1− η)V jj (a) + ηV 0j
]
(13)
for any a ∈ E∗2 and the associated players {i, j} = AP(a);










(1− η)2 + η2]V 0k + η(1− η)
[





for any a ∈ E∗2 , any k /∈ AP(a) ∪ SD∗, and {i, j} = AP(a);
V 0k (a) = (1− δk)uk(aηi , aηj , a−i−j)
+ δk
{[
(1− η)2 + η2]V 0k + η(1− η)
[





for any a ∈ E∗2 , any k ∈ SD∗ (note that AP(a) ∩ SD∗ = ∅ by (2-i)), and
{i, j} = AP(a); and
V k(a) = [1− νk(a)]u(sˆ(k)) + νk(a)V 0 (16)
for any a ∈ E∗2 and any k ∈ AP(a).
Regarding system (5)–(16), we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1 There exist ηˆ ∈ (0, ζ¯], λˆ > 0, κˆ > 0, and δˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
(i) System (5)–(16) has a solution if η ≤ ηˆ, λi ≤ λˆ, and δi ≥ δˆ for any i.
(ii) The solution satisﬁes
|V 0i − vi| <  (17)
for any i, and
1− νk(a)
1− δk > κˆ (18)
for any a ∈ E∗ and any k ∈ AP(a).
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Proof. We ﬁrst examine system (5)–(16) when η = λi = 0 for any i. By
(5), (6), (8), (10), (12), (14), and (15), any solution satisﬁes
V 0i = vi (19)
V 0i (a) = (1− δi)ui(a) + δivi










for any i and a ∈ E∗1(i). Since v is supportable, vi > ui(sˆ(i)). Since
a′i ∈ Bi(a), (20) has a unique solution νi(a) ∈ (0, 1) if δi is suﬃciently close





vi − ui(sˆ(i)) . (21)










for all k ∈ {i, j} = AP(a). Since {i, j} ⊆ D(a) and v is supportable,
vk > uk(sˆ(k)) for all k ∈ {i, j}. Since a′k ∈ Bk(a) for all k ∈ {i, j}, (22) has
a unique solution (νi(a), νj(a)) ∈ (0, 1)2 if δi and δj are both suﬃciently close





vk − uk(sˆ(k)) (23)
for all k ∈ AP(a).
Hence, if η = λi = 0 for all i, then there exists δˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that if
δi ≥ δˆ for all i, then system (5)–(16) has a unique solution satisfying (17).
Moreover, if we choose







then (21) and (23) imply that (18) holds for all a ∈ E∗ and all k ∈ AP(a).
By the standard continuity argument, there exist ηˆ ∈ (0, ζ¯], λˆ > 0, and
δˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that if η ≤ ηˆ, λi ≤ λˆ, and δi ≥ δˆ for all i, then system
(5)–(16) has a nearby solution satisfying (17) and (18). Q.E.D.
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For any player k, if BRk(sˆ(i)) = Ak for some i, then let
pk = min
{
uk(sˆ(i))− uk(ak, sˆ−k(i)) :
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ak /∈ BRk(sˆ(i))
}
> 0.
That is, any player k who plays a suboptimal action against a penal code
Nash equilibrium loses at least pk in terms of per-stage payoﬀs.
For any player k, if k /∈ D(a) for some a ∈ E∗1 , then let
rk = min
{
uk(a)− uk(aˆk, a−k) :
a ∈ E∗1 , k /∈ D(a), and aˆk /∈ BRk(a)
}
> 0.
This means that if player k such that k /∈ D(a) for some a ∈ E∗1 plays a
suboptimal action against a−k, then she loses at least rk in terms of per-stage
payoﬀs.
For any player k, if k /∈ (Dw (a) ∪ SD(a)) for some a ∈ E∗2 , then let
qk = min
{
uk(a)− uk(aˆk, a−k) :
a ∈ E∗2 , k /∈ (Dw (a) ∪ SD(a)), and aˆk = ak
}
> 0.
Thus, if player k does not play ak against a−k, then she loses at least qk in
terms of per-stage payoﬀs.
Let ρ = mina∈E∗ ρ(a) and ∆i = maxa,a′∈A(ui(a) − ui(a′)). We then
choose η¯ ∈ (0, ηˆ], λ¯ = (λ¯i)ni=1 ∈ (0, λˆ]n, and δ = (δi)ni=1 ∈ [δˆ, 1)n that satisfy
the following inequalities:
(1− δi + 2η¯)(∆i + λ¯i) ≤ δi(1− η¯)2
[
vi − − ui(sˆ(i))
]
(24)
for any i such that vi −  > ui(sˆ(i));
λ¯i ≤ δiρκˆ(η¯/2)(1− η¯)pi (25)
for any i /∈ SD∗ such that BRi(sˆ(k)) = Ai for some k;
(1− δi)λ¯i ≤ δiρκˆ(η¯/2)
[
−(1− δi + η¯)(∆i + λ¯i) + δi
[
vi − − ui(sˆ(i))
]]
(26)
for any i such that i ∈ AP(a) for some a ∈ E∗2 ;
λ¯i ≤ δiρκˆ(1− η¯)
[
(1− η¯)ri − η¯∆i
]
(27)
for any i such that i /∈ D(a) for some a ∈ E∗1 ; and
λ¯i ≤ δiρκˆ(1− η¯)2
[




for any i such that i /∈ (Dw (a) ∪ SD(a)) for some a ∈ E∗2 .
Let us consider Γ(δ, λ) with δ ≥ δ and λ ≤ λ¯. Fix η ∈ [η¯/2, η¯] and
consider the system (5)–(16) associated with η, λ, and δ. By Lemma 1, the
system has a solution satisfying (17) and (18).
We now construct an equilibrium of Γ(δ, λ) that approximates v. We
start with describing the play on the path. The equilibrium play in each pe-
riod depends on the “state” of that period. The set of states is {0, 1, . . . , n}.
State 0 is called the “cooperative state,” while states i ≥ 1 are called “pun-
ishment states.” State i ≥ 1 is the state in which player i is punished.
The play in state 0 is determined by the “substate” of the period, which is
determined by the sunspot in that period. The set of substates is identiﬁed
with E∗, and each substate a ∈ E∗ is realized with probability ρ(a). In
substate a ∈ E∗1(i), (aηi , a−i) is played, while in substate a ∈ E∗2 , aη =
(aηi , a
η
j , a−i−j) is played where {i, j} = AP(a). In substate a ∈ E∗1(i), all
players except for i monitor the other players. In substate a ∈ E∗2 , all
players not in SD∗ monitor the other players. This describes the play in the
cooperative state. In state i ≥ 1, on the other hand, the players play sˆ(i)
and do not monitor the other players.
For future reference, given a-substate, we call action ai “cooperation,”
action a′i “minor-deviation,” and any other action “major-deviation.” Note
that, according to this terminology, only player i has a minor-deviation in
substate a ∈ E∗1(i). Likewise, in substate a ∈ E∗2 , only players i and j
associated with a can minor-deviate.
Next, we deﬁne the rule that determines the transition of states. The
initial state is 0 (cooperative). If period t− 1 is in state 0 and substate a ∈
E∗1(i), then period t is in:
(i) state i if player i major- or minor-deviated in period t− 1,
(ii) state 0 otherwise.
Note that deviations of players j = i are ignored. If period t−1 is in state 0
and substate a ∈ E∗2 , then period t is in:
(i) state k if player k ∈ Dw (a) is the only player in Dw (a) who major-
deviated in period t− 1,
(ii) state k if player k ∈ {i, j} = AP(a) is the only player who minor-
deviated in period t− 1 and all other players in Dw (a) cooperated in
period t− 1,
(iii) state 0 otherwise.
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Note that, if a ∈ E∗2 and the associated players i and j both minor-deviated,
then their deviations are ignored and the state remains 0. Any deviation of
player k /∈ Dw (a) is also ignored.
If the state changes to k because of player k’s major deviation, then the
state remains k in all subsequent periods. If the state changes to k because of
k’s minor deviation in a-substate, then the state remains k for τk(a) periods
irrespective of the actions during the periods. The state of the subsequent
period depends on the sunspot at the beginning of the period: with proba-
bility ξk(a), the state remains k for one more period and then moves back
to 0; with probability 1−ξk(a), the state moves back to 0 immediately. The
numbers τk(a) ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} and ξk(a) ∈ [0, 1) are determined uniquely by




where νk(a) is the relevant part of the solution of (5)–(16).
Note that τk(a) = 0 is possible in the unique solution of (29). If this is
the case, then the state transition after player k’s unilateral minor-deviation
is that with probability 1− ξk(a), the state remains 0, and with probability
ξk(a), the state stays in k for one period and then moves back to 0.
A subtle issue that arises when τk(a) = 0 is that the players seemingly
need two sunspots: one that determines whether the state stays at 0 or moves
to k, and the other that decides, if the state remains 0, which element of
E∗ is played. However, a single sunspot suﬃces since one can always let a
sunspot play two roles at the same time.15
The above description speciﬁes only the play on the path. However,
each player can follow the description as long as she does not deviate from
the description in terms of monitoring. To see this, note ﬁrst that if the
current period is in a-substate of the cooperative state with a ∈ E∗1(i), then
all players except for i monitor the other players, and the future state (on
the path) depends only on i’s action (recall that deviations by player j = i
are ignored). Thus the state in the next period is common knowledge even
though player i does not monitor the other players. Second, if the current
period is in substate a ∈ E∗2 and if SD∗ = ∅, then all players monitor each
other and the state in the next period is common knowledge. If SD∗ = ∅,
then the future state is common knowledge only among the players outside
SD∗. However, this does not cause a problem since each player in SD∗ plays
15For example, suppose E∗ = {a′, a′′} and ρ(a′) = ρ(a′′) = 0.5. If τk(a) = 0 and
ξk(a) = 0.5, then after a minor deviation by player k in substate a, the players can
arrange the next-period play so that sˆ(k) is played if the sunspot is in [0, 0.5], a′ if it is in
(0.5, 0.75], and a′′ if it is in (0.75, 1].
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the (strictly) dominant action in all states, including the punishment states.
Thus, the players in SD∗ can play consistently with the above description
without knowing the state.16 Finally, if the current state is i ≥ 1, then the
future state depends only on sunspots and hence is common knowledge.
Let us deﬁne a strategy proﬁle σˆ which is consistent with the state-
dependent play described above. For each i, let Hˆi be the set of all histories
for player i such that i monitored the other players whenever it was pre-
scribed by the state-dependent play. Note that, as long as the players follow
the state-dependent play, any history on the path is in Hˆi. On the other
hand, Hˆi includes other histories as well. It includes histories in which some
player(s) (including i) deviated in terms of actions, and those in which i
monitored the other players when she was not required to. Anyway, at any
history hti ∈ Hˆi, player i knows the state and therefore can follow the state-
dependent play described above. For i /∈ SD∗, let σˆi be a strategy that is
consistent with the above state-dependent play at any hti ∈ Hˆi. The behav-
ior at the remaining histories can be arbitrary. For i ∈ SD∗, let σˆi be the
strategy in which i always plays the dominant action and never monitors the
other players. Then, σˆ generates a path consistent with the state-dependent
play.
For σˆ deﬁned as above, (5)–(16) and (29) imply that
(i) V 0 is the expected payoﬀ vector under σˆ,
(ii) V 0(a) is the expected continuation payoﬀ vector at substate a, and
(iii) V i(a) is the expected continuation payoﬀ vector if the previous period
is in substate a and player i unilaterally minor-deviates in that period.
We are now ready to prove the following:
Lemma 2 Strategy proﬁle σˆ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(δ, λ) and satisﬁes
|gi(σˆ)− vi| <  for any i.
Proof. The second part follows directly from (17). Hence, it suﬃces to
prove that σˆ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(δ, λ).
We ﬁrst show that it is not proﬁtable for any player i to major-deviate in
the cooperative state. To see this, note ﬁrst that player i’s major-deviation
at substate a is not proﬁtable in the short-run term if either a ∈ E∗1(j) for
j = i (by (1-iii) and η ≤ ζ¯) or a ∈ E∗2 and i /∈ Dw (a) (by (4) and η ≤ ζ¯). In
16It is useful to note that if there exists a player in SD∗, then E∗1 = ∅, since (1-i) and
(1-ii) cannot hold simultaneously.
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either case, a major-deviation is not proﬁtable since it yields no gain in the
short run and does not change the future path. In any other case, we have
vi− > ui(sˆ(i)). In this case, if i major-deviates unilaterally, then the future
play is the inﬁnite repetition of sˆ(i). While the major-deviation increases
the current period payoﬀ at most by ∆i +λi (note that i can also deviate in
monitoring), the continuation payoﬀ decreases at least by vi − − ui(sˆ(i)).
By (24),
(1− δi)(∆i + λi) ≤ δi
[
vi − − ui(sˆ(i))
]
.
Therefore, a major-deviation does not pay.
By (6), (7), and (10)–(13), any player who can minor-deviate given a
cooperative substate is indiﬀerent between cooperation and minor-deviation.
Thus, in the cooperative state, no player has an incentive to deviate in terms
of action. It is easy to see that, in state i ≥ 1, no player has an incentive to
deviate in terms of action or monitoring since a stage game Nash equilibrium
is played and the future state depends only on sunspots (until the state
moves back to 0). Thus, the proof is complete if we show that no player has
an incentive to deviate in terms of monitoring at any substate a of state 0.
We start with substates in E∗1 .
Substates in E∗1 . Let us examine the monitoring incentive in state 0 when
the substate is a ∈ E∗1(i) for some i. In the substate, all players except for i
monitor the other players. Since the future play depends only on player i’s
action, player i has no incentive to monitor the others.
Consider player j = i. Suppose that the substate was a ∈ E∗1(i) in
period t and player j cooperated as prescribed by σˆ but did not monitor the
other players. Then, in period t + 1, she is uncertain whether the state is 0
or i, since she does not know whether the action of player i in period t was
cooperation or minor-deviation. In what follows, we show that player j has
an incentive to eliminate the uncertainty if the observation cost is suﬃciently
small.
If player i (and the others) cooperated in period t, then the state remains
cooperative in period t+1. The substate remains a with probability ρ(a) ≥
ρ, in which case the other players play (aηi , a−i−j) again. On the other hand,
if player i minor-deviated in period t, then the other players play sˆ−j(i) in
period t+1 with a positive probability. More precisely, if τ i(a) ≥ 1, sˆ−j(i) is
played with probability 1. If τ i(a) = 0, then sˆ−j(i) is played with probability
ξi(a) and (aηi , a−i−j) is played with the remaining probability. (29) tells us
that when τ i(a) = 0, ξi(a) is given by
ξi(a) =
1− νi(a)
1− δi > κˆ, (30)
29
where the inequality follows from (18).
Hence, if player j did not monitor the others at the end of period t,
then in period t+1, with a probability no less than ρκˆ, she is in a situation
where she believes that the other players play sˆ−j(i) with probability η and
(aηi , a−i−j) with probability 1− η. In this situation, since the state is either
i or 0 with substate a ∈ E∗1(i), player j’s action in period t + 1 does not
change the future play. By (1-ii), player j has no action that is a (static) best
response against both sˆ−j(i) and a−j . If she plays an action aˆj /∈ BRj(sˆ(i)),
then she loses at least pj in the period if the other players coordinate on
sˆ−j(i), which occurs with probability η ≥ η¯/2 > 0. On the other hand, if she
plays aˆj /∈ BRj(a), then she loses at least rj if the other players coordinate
on a−j , which occurs with probability (1− η)2 ≥ (1− η¯)2 > 0.
Thus, by not monitoring the other players in period t, player j saves
λj ≤ λ¯j in the period but suﬀers an expected loss of at least
ρκˆmin
{
(η¯/2)pj , (1− η¯)
[
(1− η¯)rj − η¯∆j
]}
in period t + 1 and possibly more in the future. By (25) and (27), the
deviation is not proﬁtable.
Substates in E∗2 . We now consider the cooperative state with substate
a ∈ E∗2 . In this substate, σˆ tells all players outside SD∗ to monitor the
other players. Let {i, j} = AP(a). We examine the monitoring incentive of
a given player k in the substate.
Case 1: k ∈ SD∗. Under σˆ, player k ∈ SD∗ plays the dominant action
ak in every period regardless of the state (note that the dominant action
must be played in any penal code Nash equilibrium). Since her play never
aﬀects the future play of the other players, she has no reason to monitor the
other players.
Case 2: k /∈ Dw (a) ∪ SD(a). This implies that ak is a unique best
response to a−k while it is not the dominant action. Note that k /∈ AP(a).
Suppose that in period t, the substate was a and player k cooperated but
did not monitor. If the other players all cooperated or the associated players
{i, j} both minor-deviated, then with probability ρ(a) ≥ ρ, the other players
play aη−k again in period t + 1. On the other hand, if either i or j (but not
both) minor-deviated, then sˆ−k(h) is played in period t+1 where h ∈ {i, j}
is the minor-deviator.
By the same argument as above, if player k did not monitor the other
players in period t, then in period t + 1, with a probability no smaller than
ρκˆ, player k is in a situation where she believes that the other players play
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aη−k with probability (1 − η)2 + η2, sˆ−k(i) with probability η(1 − η), and
sˆ−k(j) with probability η(1− η).
In this situation, since the state is either i, j, or 0 with substate a,
player k’s action does not aﬀect the future play. If player k plays ak, then
by (2-iii), she loses at least pk in the period if either the other players
coordinate on sˆ−k(i) or they coordinate on sˆ−k(j), each of which occurs
with probability η(1 − η) ≥ (η¯/2)(1 − η¯). On the other hand, if she plays
any other action, then she loses at least qk if the other players coordinate
on a−k, which occurs with probability [(1− η)2 + η2](1− η)2 ≥ (1− η¯)4.
Therefore, by not observing the other players in period t, player k saves
λk ≤ λ¯k but suﬀers an expected loss of at least
ρκˆmin
{
(η¯/2)(1− η¯)pk, (1− η¯)2
[
(1− η¯)2qk − [1− (1− η¯)2]∆k
]}
in period t + 1 (in terms of stage-game payoﬀs) and possibly more in the
future. Therefore, by (25) and (28), the deviation is not proﬁtable.
Case 3: k ∈ Dw (a)\{i, j}. Suppose that in period t, the state was 0 with
substate a, and player k ∈ Dw (a)\{i, j} cooperated but did not monitor the
other players. Then by a similar argument, it follows that in period t + 1,
with a probability no smaller than ρκˆ, player k is in a situation where she
believes that the other players play aη−k with probability (1−η)2+η2, sˆ−k(i)
with probability η(1− η), and sˆ−k(j) with probability η(1− η).
We ﬁrst show that, under the uncertainty, it is suboptimal for player k
to play any action a′′k = ak. Indeed, she gains by choosing ak and monitoring
the other players. To see this, note ﬁrst that playing ak and monitoring the
other players decreases the current payoﬀ at most by ∆k +λk. On the other
hand, it does not decrease the continuation payoﬀ if the state is either i or j.
If the state is 0 with substate a, which occurs with probability 1−2η(1−η),
then playing ak and monitoring the other players increases the continuation
payoﬀ (from period t + 2 on) at least by
[1− 2η(1− η)]V 0k + η(1− η)[V ik (a) + V jk (a)]− uk(sˆ(k))
> [vk − − uk(sˆ(k))]− 2η(1− η)(∆k + λk).
Therefore, by (24), the overall payoﬀ evaluated at t+1 increases by playing
ak and monitoring the other players.
However, (2-iii) implies that playing ak in period t + 1 causes a loss of
at least pk to player k in the period if the state is either i or j, each of
which occurs with probability η(1− η). Thus, by not monitoring the other
players in period t, player k saves λk ≤ λ¯k but suﬀers an expected loss of at
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least ρκˆ(η¯/2)(1− η¯)pk in period t + 1 (in terms of stage game payoﬀs) and
possibly more in the future. Therefore, by (25), not monitoring in period t
is not optimal.
Case 4: k ∈ {i, j}. Without loss of generality, let k = i. We ﬁrst
consider the case in which player i cooperated but did not monitor the
other players in period t. Then, again, with a probability no less than ρκˆ,
player i in period t + 1 is in a situation where she believes that the other
players play aη−i with probability 1− η and sˆ−i(j) with probability η. Using
a similar argument and (24), it can be shown that, under the uncertainty, it
is suboptimal for i to play any a′′i /∈ {ai, a′i}. However, by (2-ii), playing ai or
a′i causes a loss of at least pi in the period if the other players coordinate on
sˆ−i(j). Therefore, by (25), not monitoring the other players is suboptimal.
We also have to consider the case in which player i minor-deviated and
then did not monitor the other players in period t. Then, in period t + 1,
player i is uncertain whether the state is i or 0; the latter occurs if j also
minor-deviated in period t. Then, by a similar argument, it follows that with
a probability no smaller than ρκˆ, player i in period t + 1 is in a situation
where she believes that the other players play sˆ−i(i) with probability 1− η
and aη−i with probability η. Under the uncertainty, if player i chooses an
action a′′i ∈ {ai, a′i}, then by (2-ii), it causes a loss of at least pi in the period
if the other players coordinate on sˆ−i(i). On the other hand, if she plays
any a′′i /∈ {ai, a′i}, it is regarded as a major-deviation if the other players
coordinate on (aηj , a−j−i), which occurs with probability η.
Thus, if player i does not monitor the other players at period t, she
saves λi ≤ λ¯i in the period but the continuation payoﬀ evaluated at period t




−(1− δi)(∆i + λi) + δi
[
ηV ji (a) + (1− η)V 0i − ui(sˆ(i))
]]
.
The second value is greater than the right-hand side of (26). Therefore, by
(25) and (26), not monitoring at period t is suboptimal.
Case 5: k ∈ SD(a) \ SD∗. Then since k /∈ SD∗, there exist aˆ ∈ E∗ such
that aˆk = ak. By Condition (s-iv) of supportability, there exists such an
aˆ that satisﬁes either aˆ ∈ E∗2 or [aˆ ∈ E∗1(k) and aˆ′k = ak], where aˆ′k is the
minor-deviation from aˆ for player k. As before, suppose that in period t, the
state was 0 with substate a and player k cooperated but did not monitor the
other players. Then, in the next period, with positive probability no smaller
than ρκˆ, the player is uncertain whether the state is 0 with substate aˆ or is
either i or j. As before, we show that the loss that player k suﬀers from the
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uncertainty exceeds the monitoring cost. We distinguish the following two
cases.
First, consider the case when aˆ ∈ E∗2 . An argument similar to the previ-
ous ones can show that, under the uncertainty, choosing a major-deviation
from aˆ is not optimal for player k. That is, it is suboptimal for her to play
a′′k /∈ {aˆk, aˆ′k} if k ∈ AP(aˆ) and a′′k = aˆk if k /∈ AP(aˆ). However, by aˆk = ak
and (2-ii), neither aˆk nor aˆ′k (if well deﬁned) is the dominant action, and
therefore, playing either action causes a loss of at least pk in the period if the
other players coordinate on sˆ−k(i) or sˆ−k(j), which occurs with probability
2η(1− η). Thus, the desired conclusion follows from (25).
Second, consider the case when aˆ ∈ E∗1(k) and aˆ′k = ak. A similar
argument shows that, under the uncertainty, a major-deviation from aˆ is
not optimal for player k. But, since neither aˆk nor aˆ′k is her dominant
action, playing either action causes a loss of at least pk in the period if the
other players coordinate on sˆ−k(i) or sˆ−k(j), which occurs with probability
2η(1− η). Thus, the desired conclusion follows from (25).
These arguments prove that no player has an incentive to deviate in
terms of monitoring on the equilibrium path. Q.E.D.
The next lemma completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 3 There exists a sequential equilibrium in Γ(δ, λ) that generates the
same path as σˆ.
Proof. We start with the construction of a system of beliefs. First, consider
a sequence of totally mixed strategy proﬁles that converges to σˆ and puts
far smaller weights on the trembles regarding monitoring, in comparison
with the trembles regarding actions. This generates a sequence of systems
of beliefs, whose limit is a system of belief that is consistent with σˆ and such
that, at any history (on or oﬀ the path), each player believes that the other
players did not deviate in terms of monitoring. Let us denote the system of
beliefs by µ and let µ(hti) denote the belief of player i at history h
t
i about
the other players’ (private) histories.
We now construct each player’s strategy, σ∗i . For players i ∈ SD∗, we





i) for any h
t
i ∈ Hˆi. (31)
For any hti /∈ Hˆi, let σ∗i (hti) be an optimal continuation strategy at hti given
her belief µ(hti) and the other players’ strategies σˆ−i.
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(31) means that, for any player i, σ∗i and σˆi coincide at all histories h
t
i
in which i never deviates in terms of monitoring. This together with the
construction of µ implies that µ is also consistent with σ∗.
We now verify sequential rationality. We start with a player i /∈ SD∗ and
a history hti ∈ Hˆi. At the history, player i knows the state. Moreover, by the
construction of µ, player i believes that the other players not in SD∗ also
know the state since i believes that these players never deviated in terms of
monitoring. In other words, i believes that any other player j /∈ SD∗ is at a
history in Hˆj and any other player j ∈ SD∗ plays her dominant action in all
subsequent periods. Then, by Lemma 2 and (31), it is optimal for player i
to follow the state-dependent play, i.e., σˆi. By (31), this is exactly what σ∗i




We now consider a player i /∈ SD∗ at a history hti /∈ Hˆi. We deﬁned
σ∗i (h
t
i) as an optimal continuation strategy at the history given that i’s belief
is µ(hti) and the other players follow σˆ−i (not σ
∗
−i). Sequential rationality
then follows since player i believes that all other players j /∈ SD∗ are at
some histories htj ∈ Hˆj and therefore, by (31), their continuation strategies
coincide with σ∗j (h
t
j).
Finally, consider player i ∈ SD∗. At any history, she believes that the
other players never deviated in terms of monitoring and thus she believes
that her play does not aﬀect the future play. Thus, given σ∗−i and µ, it is
sequentially rational for i to play a short-run best response at any history.
This is nothing but following σ∗i .
Therefore, (σ∗, µ) is a sequential equilibrium of Γ(δ, λ). By (31), it
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